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ABSTRACT 
The main thesis of this paper is that student unrest in India is not always necessarily a
manifestation of juvenile delinquency, and given certain conditions can change into an 
articulated movement. This is substantiated through an analysis of the nature and content of 
student activism in India during the seventies, covering an important phase in the history of 
modern India, namely, the state of "Internal" Emergency. Part One analyses the genesis and 
growth of the student movement in 1974 1975. Part Two discusses the suppression of 
student activism during the Emergency. The rise and fall of the Youth Congress during this 
period is outlined. Part Three presents a scenario f student unrest in the post-Emergency 
period and highlights the reappearance of the sixties'-type ofthe student agitations. The article 
summarizes the development of the student movement during the pre-Emergency period, 
accounts for the reversal in the movement since the end of Emergency, and discusses the 
prospects of the re-emergence of such a movement. 
The Pre-Emergency Scene 
The history of student act iv ism in India has been a chequered one as 
part  of the national ist  movement .  It is often argued that the nature and 
content of student act iv ism have undergone a qual itat ive change since Inde- 
pendence (Altbach,  1968a; p. 17, Ross, 1969, p. 19). The crux of the argument  
runs as follows: while the pre- Independence student movement  had a single 
goal, namely,  independence for India, and was linked to the country 's  life 
and politics, the wave of student agitat ions since 1947 has not been directly 
polit ical but has concerned local and non- ideological  issues. Also, student 
agitat ions have become basical ly disruptive and lost the character  of a move-  
ment. 
In the sixties, the colleges and universities were the scene of student 
agitations. It is est imated that in 1966 there were 2,206 student demonst ra -  
tions, of which 480 were violent (Altbach, 1968a, p. 53). The prominent  
student agitat ions till 1968 have been recorded by A l tbach (1968a), and the 
Vishwa Yuvak  Kendra  (1973, pp. 59 - 98) has documented  59 student agita- 
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tions which have obstructed the normal functioning of academic institutions 
during 1968. 
A close examination of the series of student strikes in Karnataka (Ross, 
1969), Benares (Ray, 1977), Calcutta (Dasgupta, 1974), and elsewhere 
(Vishwa Yuvak Kendra, 1973) in the sixties, and in Delhi (Singhal, 1977) 
during the early seventies highlights that in the sixties the student agitations 
started gradually regaining an organized form. Student unions came to be 
increasingly influenced by political parties though devoid of ideological fer- 
your. But it was only in 1974 that the student agitations tarted manifesting 
characteristics of an articulated movement. It originated in Gujarat, spread 
to Bihar and was later transformed into a country-wide movement. 
GUJARAT: NAVNIRMAN SAMITI 
The rising inflation of the early seventies marked the turning point in the 
economic scene and paved the way for socio-politicat changes. It is reported 
that between 1971-72 and 1973-74 the per capita availability of food 
grains fell by 11 per cent and industrial production stagnated, and whereas 
the wholesale price index rose by 33 per cent, the per capita income declined 
by 4.2 per cent. During 1972-73, prices of food grains, edible oil, vegetables 
and meat rose by 30 to more than 100 per cent. Such essential commodi- 
ties as rice, wheat, cooking oil and kerosene became scarce (Hiro 1978: 
255-257). 
Spiralling prices and growing scarcity meant untold hardship to the 
people, who, especially in the urban, areas, blamed the ruling Congress 
government for this and began expressing their discontent through rallies 
and strikes. The opposition political parties joined the protest. Instead of 
stopping the sliding of the living standards of the masses, the Congress 
government became defensive and resorted to the use of force to quell the 
protest. During the first half of 1973, the army was called out seventeen times 
to restore law and order - a record in post-Independence India (Race Today, 
Aug. 1975, p. 179). This only aggravated people's antagonism towards the 
government. This also marked the beginning of tlie systematic student move- 
ment directed against he Congress government, whose first phase occurred in 
Gujarat. 
In December 1973, the resident students at an engineering college in 
Ahmadabad were asked to pay a 41 per cent higher mess bill the following 
month. The striking students turned violent and burnt public property. The 
Congress government in Gujarat resorted to ruthless handling of the situa- 
tion. A large contingent of police was sent to quell the unrest. But this 
was counter-productive, as the police excesses further widened the exist- 
ing alienation between Che students and the people on the one hand and the 
government on the other. The movement spread like wildfire throughout the 
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state under the banner of Navnirman Samiti. In the course of four weeks of  
riots in January-February 1974, engineered mainly by the students, the 
police had to open fire on people 347 times, three times the annual average 
for the country as a whole (Race Today, August 1975, p. 179). 
All this led to the imposition of President's Rule in Gujarat on February 
2, 1974, but the assembly was kept in suspended animation, with the hope of 
re-forming the Congress government once the tension cooled down. The 
strategy of the central government betrayed its ulterior motives and another 
bout of agitation occurred demanding the dissolution of the state assembly 
and the holding of fresh elections. The students evolved the novel technique 
of pressuring ~-he legislative assembly members to resign their seats. Seven- 
teen Congress members responded to the students' pressure and resigned 
their seats. On March 17, 1974 the state assembly was dissolved. This was a 
great achievement for the student movement. 
A latent consequence of this movement was the acquisition of a moral 
halo by the future Prime Minister, Morarji Desai, who had joined the 
struggle started by the students, and started on a fast unto death supporting 
the demand for the dissolution of the state assembly. He conveniently des- 
cribed the outcome of the students' struggle as a "victory of the people's 
struggle". While exhorting the students to carry on their planned reconstruc- 
tion work with courage and conviction, he pleaded for non-violence. 
"Here was youth power channelized to achieve something concrete - a 
phenomenon unthinkable till then" (Pandit, 1977, p. 142). The government 
little realized that it was facing the beginnings of a mass student movement. 
It was at this juncture that Jayaprakash Narayan realized the significance of 
student power. The Gujarat incident provided the inspiration that Narayan 
had been waiting for. 
BIHAR: CHHATRA SANGHARSHA SAMITI 
Jayaprakash Narayan, an erstwhile Sarvodaya leader, was planning to 
lead a people's movement against what he described as widespread corrup- 
tion in the country. Encouraged by the achievements of the student move- 
ment Navnirman Samiti in Gujarat, Narayan gradually moulded students of 
Bihar. 
On March 18, 1974, the Governor of Bihar was due to address the Bihar 
legislature. Narayan and the students tried to prevent he governor and the 
legislators from reaching the legislature. The state government reacted with 
an excessive show of police force and the next two days witnessed unprece- 
dented violence. The then Union Home Minister admitted that during those 
two days the police had opened fire nine times resulting in the death of eight 
and injury to seventy-two people. 
In April 1974 a unique protest march called the Maun Julus took place. 
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Volunteers of various non-violent groups were selected under oath to prac- 
tice peace, silence, and thoughts of goodwill against the enemy. Led by 
Narayan they silently marched through the streets of Patna. It turned out to 
be an echo of the national conscience, and was described as "a deadening 
calm pregnant with typhoon". 
In June 1974, Narayan called on the students to stay away from the 
classroom for one year so that they could fully devote themselves to the 
movement. This call was reiterated by the Chhatra Sangharsha Samiti which 
demanded the immediate closure of all the universities and colleges in Bihar. 
The state government was determined to hold the annual examinations, 
which had already been postponed once. The political atmosphere in the 
state was turning turbulent as the intermediate examination approached. 
It is also important o note the alliances that were forged during 
this period. In Gujarat, the student wing of the right Jan Sangh combined 
with that of the Socialist Party to form the Navnirman Samiti, and the 
Congress (0) supported the Samiti. The same combination clicked in Bihar 
under the banner of Chhatra Sangharsha Samiti. The ultimate fruit of such a 
combination was the development of a united opposition political front, 
which became the Janata Party which later took power at the Centre and 
in a few north-Indian states. It is "a kind of political illogicality that went 
way beyond the rational understanding of those who had learnt to play 
politics only in the Western ways" (Pandit, 1977, p. 147). 
By June 1975 the atmosphere was characterized by disenchantment and 
disillusionment. The central government grew increasingly repressive. The 
movement was spreading to other parts of the country. The popular eaction 
to the Congress rule was indicated by the fact that the party lost the Gujarat 
mid-term election in June 1975. On June 12, 1975 the fateful Allahabad High 
Court judgement was handed own declaring the election of Indira Gandhi, 
the then Prime Minister, to the Lok Sabha null and void. The opposition was 
preparing to launch a national campaign to secure her resignation. But on 
June 26 the presidential proclamation declared a, state of "Internal" Emer- 
gency. 
The "Internal" Emergency and Suppression of Student Activism 
Whatever may be the explanation about the eventsleading to the Emer- 
gency, the period will go down in the history of India as a brutal and 
ignominious one. We shall confine ourselves to the plight of student activism 
during this period. Recognizing the disruptive potential of the student move- 
ment, Mrs. Gandhi's government dealt harshly with student activism and 
jailed many key student leaders. 
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The various measures taken by the Congress government to suppress 
student activism may be broadly categorized into direct and indirect. 
Among the direct measures, at the outset, the government arrested, detai- 
ned, and tortured the student leaders belonging to or sympathetic to the 
opposition parties. In some universities, such as Delhi University, intelli- 
gence agents were enrolled as students to discover the secret structure of 
student activism and underground resistance. Students who were found to be 
in any way sympathetic to the opposition party or showing opposition to the 
ruling party or its programmes were blacklisted and thrown out of the college 
or university or denied admission. 
Secondly, the students' unions were depoliticized. Elections for students' 
unions were banned, and directives were issued for the formation of student 
"associations" through nominations or indirect election. The functions of 
such "associations" were to be purely cultural. Finally the government pro- 
pagated the idea of the "constructive role of students in the implementation 
of the '20 point' programme and national development". 
While the foregoing dealt a death blow to the nascent student move- 
ment, other measures were instituted under the subterfuge of educational 
reforms. The universities were advised to semesterize courses starting with 
the first-degree level. Not only was the so called "semester system" a sham of 
the system working in the Western countries - as it involved a change neither 
in the content nor in the method of teaching, but only the multiplication of 
examinations and greater control over the students - but it was also intro- 
duced almost overnight with absolutely no preparation. Under the semester 
system, the students were constantly kept busy with course work and exami- 
nations, giving them little time to think about anything else. 
Secondly, the government tried to appease the students belonging to the 
so called "Backward Classes" by proclaiming measures - like reservation of 
seats, concession in fees, etc. ~ in addition to the existing constitutional 
reservations and facilities for the benefit of students belonging to the Sche- 
duled Castes and Tribes. This resulted in a discernible cleavage among the 
students whose interests now stood divided, and this had pernicious conse- 
quences for the student movement. 
Finally, in some states, such as Maharashtra and Karnataka, the 
governments promulgated ordinances reorganizing the structure and func- 
tioning of universities, resulting in the curtailment of academic freedom 
within and autonomy of the universities on the one hand, and the increased 
governmental interference in, and the undemocratic functioning of the uni- 
versities on the other hand. 
NEHRU UNIVERSITY UNDER THE EMERGENCY 
Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) in New Delhi is one of India's most 
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prestigious universities. Focusing on post-graduate study and with a small 
and highly articulate student population, the university has been one of the 
most radical in India. It was not surprising that government repression was 
especially intense at JNU, starting with the arrest of sixty student leaders in 
July 1975, and continuing for the entire period of the Emergency. These 
arrests marked the birth of a resistance among the students, led mainly by the 
Students Federation of India (SFI), which engaged in underground activi- 
ties. It kept a steady stream of handouts, bulletins, and other materials going 
in order to inform students of government actions and to keep the spirit of 
dissent alive. 
With the onset of the Emergency, university authorities acted to restrict 
the Students' Union, which was somewhat unique in India in that it was 
completely independent of the university administration. Membership, which 
had been mandatory, was shifted to voluntary, thus weakening the orga- 
nization. The university also imposed "norms of behaviour for students" 
without student input, and this was also condemned by the students. Finally, 
university authorities expelled a number of students who were sympathetic to
opposition groups. The Students' Union called for a boycott of classes on 
August 22, 1975 and the faculty supported this boycott. While the boycott 
was almost completely successful, the university kept up its pressure and 
continued to deal harshly with dissidents. Another student strike was called 
in September, and this was also successful. University authorities called in 
the police and more student activists were arrested. 
While most students upported the resistance and heeded the boycotts 
and strikes, the student community was not completely united. The All India 
Students' Federation (AISF), student group of the pro-Moscow Communist 
Party of India, which at the time supported the Emergency, denounced the 
resistance and advocated a return to normalcy on the campus. The continu- 
ing factional disputes between the leftist SFI and the AISF no doubt played a 
role in this situation, which resulted in a loss of support for the AISF. 
New university policies reduced the Students' Union to a cultural associ- 
ation, eliminated the democratic structure of the organization, provided aca- 
demic authorities with power to nominate individuals for union positions, 
and in general changed the nature of the organization. The right of the union 
to protest university decisions was eliminated, and the union was provided 
with a staff advisor who had veto power over all decisions. The university 
took authority to dismiss any student from the union or from the university. 
After implementing these new regulations, the Registrar of the Univeristy 
informed the Students' Union leadership that they had been ousted and the 
existing union "derecognized". 
The dissolution of the Students' Union heralded the iniquitous uccess 
of the university authorities. On November 7, the "ex-president" of the Stu- 
dents' Union was expelled from the university for six months and on Novem- 
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ber ll he was arrested and detained under the Maintenance of Internal 
Security Act. 
In this situation, the AISF abruptly changed its stand. In its pamphlet 
entitled "The Truth About 'Resistance' " it vehemently criticized the SFI- 
led resistance, and accused the SFI of working against its candidate in the 
Delhi University Students' Union elections. It appealed to the honest sec- 
tion of the SFI-influenced students to "down with left opportunism" and 
"professional hoodwinkers", and return to the broad democratic left move- 
ment. 
Thus came to an end the saga of resistance which nevertheless continued 
once the Emergency was lifted. It is the commitment of the SFI to the 
resistance and the vacillation of the AISF during the Emergency that 
accounts for the immense popularity of the former and the weakness of the 
latter on the JNU campus today. 
SUPPRESSION IN DELHI UNIVERSITY AND ELSEWHERE 
While the saga of suppression and resistance in JNU was unique for its 
sophistication, the suppression of student activists in Delhi University and 
elsewhere was also significant. The case of Hemant Kumar Vishnoi is note- 
worthy. Vishnoi was closely associated with the rightist Rashtriya Swayam 
Sevak Sangh and the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (hereafter Vidyar- 
thi Parishad), which had captured about seventy percent of the students' 
unions in the university, and was the target of government surveillance. His 
election as Secretary of the Delhi University Students' Union immediately 
caught the attention of the government, since Vishnoi and his Vidyarthi 
Parishad associates had won the university elections on issues involving the 
Gujarat-Bihar movement. 
On the eve of the Emergency, Vishnoi was away in Rhotak attending a 
students' camp. On his return to Delhi he had to go underground as he 
learnt that the President of the Delhi University Students' Union had been 
arrested and that the police were looking for him. Since most of the leaders 
had gone underground, it was difficult if not impossible for him to establish 
contact with his fellow Parishad leaders. A meeting with the General Secre- 
tary of the Vidyarthi Parishad resulted in rough plans of action. The police, 
however, sensed the situation; the underground office was raided and the 
General Secretary of the Vidyarthi Parishad was arrested. 
On the eve of the reopening of colleges the police rounded up about fifty 
leaders who were considered to be influential. The Sangharsha Samiti ssued 
a pamphlet condemning the arrests and urging the students to fight such 
repression and called upon them to observe July 25 as a "close-the-university 
demand day". With more policemen than students on the campus, July 25 
and 26 proved to be days of terror. In all 186 people were arrested, including 
some 120 college teachers. 
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In the light of the increasing difficulty and risk involved in communica- 
tion a new method was evolved. Picnics were organized in open places and 
parks where underground people could meet and exchange information. At 
one such "picnic", following information leakage, Vishnoi was arrested along 
with other students. Then followed the inhuman third-degree methods of 
torture of Vishnoi and his associates to get secrets about the underground 
movement. 
This, however, was not an isolated incident; the suppression of student 
leaders was almost a national phenomenon. 
Held under the Defence of India Rules, or Maintenance ofInternal Security Act, they 
[student leaders] came from universities and colleges - an incomplete list alone contains 
over one hundred institutions.., from one end of India to another (Selbourne, 1977, 
p. 166). 
Thus, the largest and most valuable contribution to the struggle of 
1975-1977 came from the students and youth. While the government 
apparently controlled and contained the student unrest through repressive 
tactics and by creating a fear psychosis in the community of students, the 
continuation of such a trend only aggravated the latent anxiety and angerof  
students. The pressure burst once Lok Sabha elections were announced and 
student leaders released. A new wave of student awareness was evident in 
early 1977. The students took the election as a challenge and became 
involved in campaigning for their respective parties. The students played a 
crucial role in the defeat of the ruling Congress government and the election 
of the first alternative government in the political history of India since 
Independence. 
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE YOUTH CONGRESS 
In any large and plural society it will be difficult to find a political party 
without a youth wing. The youth wings act as recruiting roups for the newly 
franchised young men looking for a political party. They bridge the 
generation gap and give a cosmopolitan character to the parent bodies. 
Further, they may be the only source of uncontaminated - though often 
naive and inflexible - idealism for the party, serving as a corrective to the 
cynicism and the will to compromise of the veteran members (Mehta, 1978, 
p. 73). 
In a study of student politics in Delhi University, Oommen observed 
that since political parties believe in the slogan "catch them young", they are 
eager to establish contacts with students and eventually "use " them for 
political purposes. The student leaders' perception that they cannot become 
"real" leaders unless they establish contacts with political parties facilitates 
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the process of politicization (Oommen, 1974, p. 791). It is in this light that we 
should understand the emergence of the Youth Congress during the 
Emergency. 
In the pre-Emergency days the Youth Congress was the rather weak 
youth wing of the Indian National Congress. It had very few members, 
lacked ideology, and had no voice in the parent body. Thus, as a pressure 
group it had virtually no impact. This hitherto dormant band got activized 
during the Emergency, as it provided the springboard for the assumption of 
power by Sanjay Gandhi, the then Prime Minister's on. With his sycophants 
hailing him as "the beacon of hope of an awakened India" and "the rising sun 
on the political horizon", he in fact emerged as the second most powerful 
politician in the country during the Emergency. 
Under his patronage the Youth Congress acquired undue recognition, 
and his mother - the Prime Minister - proclaimed at the Gauhati session of 
the All India Congress Committee that "the Youth Congress had taken the 
thunder out of the parent body's session". The Congressmen who had 
watched this with apprehension were the first to be arrested uring the 
Emergency. 
Although never elected to a formal Youth Congress post, Sanjay 
Gandhi was coopted to its Executive Council, and then exercised almost dic- 
tatorial power in the organization. He increased the membership from 
700,000 to 6,000,000 by enrolling anyone under 35 who was willing to pay 
one rupee. Many, on seeing that the Youth Congress had power within the 
Congress hierarchy, were eager to join it. As one observer put it: 
The Youth Congress became 'an umbrella' organization which sheltered a variety of 
goondas, thugs, pickpockets, criminals - all the 'bad characters' and 'anti-social' e e- 
ments police usually keep a record of (Mehta, 1978, p. 85). 
Sanjay Gandhi cleverly committed the Youth Congress to a series of 
apolitical goals such as family planning, tree planting, abolition of caste and 
the dowry system, eradication of illiteracy and slum clearance. This was 
described as a "cultural revolution", but in fact the organization proved 
mainly to be a political weapon for Sanjay Gandhi in his various struggles 
within the government. 
In due course it was recognized that the ultimate strategy of the Youth 
Congress under Sanjay Gandhi was to execute a coup in the ruling parent 
body. This was given concrete xpression in 1977 at the time of the Lok 
Sabha election, when the Youth Congress put in a claim for 200 of the 540 
seats. This raised doubts in the minds of veterarkCongressmen and the sudden 
exit of the Methuselah of Indian politics, Jagjivan Ram, changed the situa- 
tion overnight. The Congress party was reluctant to antagonize any more old 
stalwarts by inducting youth'into the election. In the final analysis, the Youth 
Congress secured less than ten nominations and later lost them all. 
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Student Activism in the Post-Emergency Period 
Contrary to expectations, the end of the Emergency did not bring peace 
and tranquility to the campus. According to an official estimate, there were 
7,520 incidents of student unrest in 1977, of which 1,146 were violent. The 
corresponding figures for 1978 till August stood at 5,838 and 1,050 respec- 
tively. State-wise, student unrest was more pronounced in Uttar Pradesh 
(22%), Maharashtra (21%) and Bihar (13%). Moreover, the percentage of
violent incidents was only 15 for the whole of 1977 whereas the corresponding 
percentage for the first eight months of 1978 was 18. What is the nature of 
student unrest in this period? 
MARATHWADA RIOTS 
An exceptional feature of Marathwada University in Maharashtra is the 
polarization of students along caste and community lines. On one side is the 
Nagasena Vana campus encompassing four colleges and hostels run by the 
People's Education Society started by Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, champion of the 
untouchables. Adjacent o it is the university campus proper. Over ninety per 
cent of the students on the Nagasena Vana campus are Harijans. While the 
government colleges reserve thirty-four percent of the seats for students 
belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Tribes, their number in private colle- 
ges is negligible according to the Annual Report of the University for 1977- 
1978. 
In July 1978, the newly formed Janata and Rebel Congress coalition 
ministry in Maharashtra decided to rename the Marathwada University after 
Ambedkar. Whatever may be the motive behind this political decision, there 
followed riots which originating on the campus in Aurangabad spread like 
wildfire throughout the State. 
On the campus, the renaming issue originated through acombination of 
the need to mark the fiftieth anniversary of Ambedkar's Mahad Satyagraha 
with a fitting memorial and certain personal manoeuvres. The campaign had 
lasted for over 18 months and was almost incident free. But the aggressive- 
ness of Dalit Panther (a Harijan group) incited Vidhyarthi Kruthi Samiti. The 
issue of protective discrimination enlarged the renaming of the university 
into a symbolic act and it became a focus of a confrontation between the 
Harijans and the caste Hindus. 
A ten-day-old state-wide strike which had resulted in loss of life and 
property was finally called off on August 6, 1978 - even as violent incidents 
were reported for the first time from Bombay, Poona, Nanded, and Nagpur -
on the assurance of the chief minister that no decision would be taken 
unless and until an amicable settlement acceptable to all concerned was 
found. There now prevails an uneasy calm in Marathwada University. 
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PANTNAGAR INCIDENT 
The Pantnagar Agricultural University was the only campus in Uttar 
Pradesh which the police had never entered to tackle law and order prob- 
lems. But in April 1978, it saw a protracted and violent strike accompanied 
by an equally brutal and persistent police action. The incident originated as a 
farm workers' agitation and developed into a campus versus police affair. 
The Pantnagar Karmachari Sangathan, which had been set up in Octo- 
ber 1977 to represent the interests of nearly 8,000 migrant farm workers, 
submitted a memorandum to the vice-chancellor threatening to go on strike 
if their demands were not met. After two unsuccessful agreements, and the 
suspension of ninety workers, the Uttar Pradesh government declared any 
strike in the university illegal. The workers' retaliation resulted in the arrest 
of 100 workers and the posting of Provincial Armed Constabulary on the 
campus. 
In March 1978, a procession of 6,000 demonstrators demanded among 
other things the repeal of the government decree declaring the strike illegal, 
the withdrawal of the constabulary from the campus, and the dismissal of the 
vice-chancellor. When the demands were not met, the strike was resumed and 
later turned violent. The constabulary opened fire on the strikers resulting in 
the death of fifty-one persons and injury to many more. The university was 
closed on the same day. In view of the prevailing tension, the university 
which was reopened on April 19, was closed again on May 5. 
It appears that the rich farmers of the area were interested in scuttling 
the strike, as they apprehended that any hike in the wages of the university 
farm workers would have repercussion on their own workers whom they had 
been exploiting with strong-arm tactics. This was effectively countered by the 
parties of the left, and some left-wing student leaders paid regular visits to 
Pantnagar to confer with the leaders of the strike. 
With 1,100 head of cattle and 19,000 fowl uncared for, and cane and 
wheat crops likely to be ruined, the indefinite closure of the university by 
striking farm workers posed a threat of great physical and monetary loss to 
the university. However, the situation eased with the resignation of the vice- 
chancellor in June 1978. 
The Pantnagar incident is unique in several respects. The Action Com- 
mittee of the university did not allow the strike to be politicized, and in fact, 
it explicitly requested the politicians to keep away from it. Moreover, the 
post-strike behaviour of Pantnagar students was exemplary. After the strike, 
but for the fullest cooperation extended by the students, hundreds of head of 
cattle would have perished, milk supply ceased, and sanitary arrangements 
on the campus collapsed. Most important, the strike was initiated by the 
workers of the university and the students joined it, with the teachers follow- 
ing suit. Perhaps this is the first instance in which the intelligentsia came out 
694 
of its closed circle to join the workers' struggle, thus heralding a new trend in 
campus activism in the country. 
STUDENT UNREST IN OTHER PARTS OF INDIA 
- College students in Bangalore went on strike demanding among other 
things the institution of a judicial inquiry into the university affairs, removal 
of the vice-chancelor and removal of the police station from the university 
campus. In October the Harijan boarders of the university's Jnanabharati 
Men's Hostel demonstrated protesting against he "harassment and discrimi- 
nation" of hostel inmates by the chief warden. Students of a Christian wom- 
en's college went on strike - for the first time in the history of the college -
demanding democratic election to the students' union of the college. 
- In Hyderabad, students went on strike in September 1978 demand- 
ing the resignation of a woman Minister for Women's Welfare, who had 
"degraded Indian women publicly". The vice-chancellor f Osmania Univer- 
sity announced the closure of all the forty-five colleges in Hyderabad and 
Secunderabad for several weeks in view of the disturbed conditions on the 
campus resulting from clashes between two groups of students belonging to 
the Progressive Democratic Students' Union and the Vidyarthi Parishad. 
- In 1979, students throughout Tamil Nadu went on strike in sym- 
pathy with striking teachers. In Pondicherry, about 4,000 students organized 
a procession to protest against he proposal to merge Pondicherry with the 
neighbouring State of Tamil Nadu. 
- In Bombay, the students of St. Xavier's College went on strike in 1977, 
against he continued attempts of the principal and the management to stifle 
free expression and democratic rights in the college. In August 1978, a strike 
against increased tuition charges culminated in the seizure of Bombay Uni- 
versity by the students, whereby the university officials, including the vice- 
chancellor , were locked out of their offices. 
- In Patna, the vice~-chancellor's security guard opened fire when the law 
examinees started hurling chairs at him on September 13, 1978. The incident 
was sparked off when the squad detected the use of unfair means by the 
examinees, who later walked out of the examination hall with their question 
papers and answer books. In Bihar and Uttar Pradesh students agitating 
against he policy of protective discrimination i  favour of the "Backward 
Classes" almost paralysed academic life for over six months. 
There has been a sharp rise in student unrest in India since the end of the 
Emergency. In 1977, agitators in several universities demanded action 
against he "Emergency excesses". The reasons for a large number of recent 
agitations are non-academic. Besides politically motivated agitations, issues 
like restoration of democratic rights, protective discrimination, renaming of 
universities, alteration of state boundaries, police excesses, and purely local 
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issues, such as bus fare increases, have disrupted the normal functioning of 
educational institutions. 
The repeated occurrence of student unrest poses a major headache to the 
government and educational authorities. Intrusions by the police into a 
university campus has become a frequent occurrence and is no longer news. 
The two-day Conference of State Governors held in March 1979 has expres- 
sed grave concern at the growth of student indiscipline in the country and has 
called for firm steps to curb it. 
Conc lus ion :  Some Theoret i ca l  Cons iderat ions  
It is not at all surprising that a segment of a society's tudent population 
should be involved in activism that is militantly directed against he status 
quo. 
It can be strongly argued, as C. Wright Mills argued, that students are the one group 
who will continue to supply recruits for such causes, even when no other stratum is 
available. A completely inactive student body is a much more curious phenomenon 
historically than one which is involved to some degree in activism (Lipset, 1972, p. 263). 
The explanations about the causes, content, and nature of student 
unrest are never the same or uniform in all the cases, because the manifesta- 
tion of student unrest in any society is not ahistorical or isolated from its 
socio-economic milieu9 Analyses of student unrest in India have highlighted 
various causes, from "high jinks" or the desire for "fun" (Ross, 1969, p. 17) 
on the one hand to acute politicization of academia (Ray, 1977, pp. 3-5) on 
the other. A recent survey of student indiscipline by the All India Committee 
of World Brotherhood lists the following causes: 
 9  too much leisure time, political participation, sex problems, poo r student teacher 
relation, lack of facilities for representation f complaint, anxiety over examination, 
student frustration (anxieties, eparations from friends or family, hurt feelings, unsatis- 
fied ambitions, financial difficulties), inadequately handled student misbehaviour, and 
emotional immaturity (quoted in Jafar, 1977, pp. xv-xvi). 
According to Singhal (1977, pp. 34-43), in addition to the economic fac- 
tors, organizational c imate and political interest in the campus, belief in 
agitational tactics and faith in violence, perception of political and govern- 
mental interference, and absence of a code of conduct are significant causal 
variables9 Ghosh (1971) has argued that student unrest in the country is being 
deliberately fostered by certain foreign agencies. 
As regards the form that the unrest takes, expression of resentment 
(both verbal and written); boycott of classes and walkout from examination 
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halls; demonstrations, rallies and courting arrests; strikes, dharnas and ghe- 
raos; and damage to public property, assault and intimidation are found to 
be salient (Singhal, 1977, pp. 128-129). As Shils (1968b, pp. 5-6) points 
out, the students invariably attack disconnected symbols like vice-chan- 
cellors, district collectors, police officers, post offices, railway stations, etc., 
rather than the center of the system, namely, the government or the regime. 
Generally, student agitation fits into Shils' characterization asa mani- 
festation of juvenile delinquency (Shils, 1968a, 1968b). The manifestations 
are severe and recurrent as some impunity is always assured. But in the 
absence of official patronage and support, they tend to be unstable and 
short-lived (Altbach 1968b, p. 198). 
This article observes that student unrest is not always necessarily a
manifestation of delinquency, and given certain conditions, it can develop 
into a concerted social movement. We have seen how the sixties witnessed a 
spate of student agitations, how in the early seventies the student agitations 
developed into a mass movement to be ruthlessly suppressed uring the 
Emergency, and how, once the Emergency was lifted, the sixties' type of 
agitations have reappeared. What accounts for this rhythmical alternation 
between growth and decline of a student movement? 
According to Smelser (1962), a society must be structurally conducive to 
the development of the type of elementary collective behaviour that will lead 
to a social movement before one can arise. In other words, the condition of 
the society must be such that new types of behaviour are possible, oi" are 
likely to appear. He identifies the presence of structural strains accompanied 
by feelings of anxiety and frustration as characterizing such a situation. This 
situation must have a Common meaning for those who share the strain, so 
that they are willing to act, and there must be a dramatic event o precipitate 
action. Finally, there should be leaders who are able to sustain the movement 
until it becomes formally organized. At every point in this development, the 
instruments of social control, such as the government, the police, or public 
opinio n, may play a decisive role in lessening or increasing the activity. They 
may also be important in determining its length and severity. 
We may supplement this structural theory of social movement with an 
approach which stresses the role of specific politically relevant historical 
events as catalysts for student movements. This approach seems to confirm 
the views of those revolutionary theorists like Bakunin and Blanqui, who 
stressed the role of intellectuals and students as the inspirers, leaders, and 
often mass troops of the revolution. In the light of these theoretical frame- 
works it is easy to comprehend the origin and development of the student 
movement in the pre-Emergency period and its evanescence since then. 
The Indian economy is characterized by a tension-ridden imbalance: the 
educational output is not commensurate with the absorptive capacity of the 
economy. Thus, between 1956 and 1974, the number of unemployed shot up 
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from 5.3 million to over 15 million. The number of registered unemployed 
(only a fraction of the total) increased from 335,000 in 1951 to 9,315,000 in 
1975 - a twenty-eight-fold increase in twenty-four years. Nearly half of the 
registered unemployed had some educational qualification, including many 
with a university degree (quoted in Hiro, 1978, p. 85). 
The ineffectiveness of the Constitution and the inability of the ruling 
party to solve any of these problems, combined with its incessant desire to 
remain in power, are glaringly exposed by the fact that between 1951 and 
1971, the Constitution was amended twenty-two times, on an average once 
every eleven and one-half months. Between 1971 and 1974, there were fifteen 
amendments, roughly one every eighty days. Almost all these amendments 
had very little to do with the welfare of the people and were basically desig- 
ned to strengthen the government's, particularly the ruling party's, position. 
In 1974, the student movement was ably served by a leadership which 
was both experienced and commanded respect. Moreover, the movement 
started by the students developed into a broader political movement with the 
government as its target. Also important in this context were the dramatic 
events of 1974-1975 - such as police firings, imposit ionof President's Rule 
in Gujarat without dissolving the state assembly, the defeat of the Congress 
party in the Gujarat mid-term election, the Allahabad High Court judgement 
declaring the election of Indira Gandhi to the Lok Sabha null and void, etc. - 
which provided the necessary klan to the movement. 
Given the course of events, the student movement could have become 
full-blown. But, the government, realizing what was in store for it, ruthlessly 
crushed the movement during the Emergency. Student leaders were arrested, 
detained, and tortured. Student unions were converted into nominated asso- 
ciations for cultural activities. Resistance to this suppression was systemati- 
cally destroyed. 
When the Emergency was lifted after the defeat of the Congress party in 
the march 1977 Lok Sabha election, the student movement had lost its raison 
d'Otre. But there were innumerable student agitations resembling those of the 
sixties. What are the prospects of the re-emergence of such a movement? The 
post-Emergency socio-economic s ene being a continuation of the pre-Emer- 
gency one, one should only expect he reappearance of such a movement. But 
whether this expectation would materialize or not will depend on other 
conditions. In the first place, after joining hands in a movement and being 
responsible for the formation of a new government, the students eem to be 
obliged to refrain from any attempt at resurrecting the movement, at least in 
the near furture. Even if they attempt it, it will not be blessed by the political 
leaders who are in power. 
Further, the various student and youth organizations which were once 
united seem to be clearly divided. For example, in Bihar, the Chhatra Sangh- 
arsha Samiti, which had led the 1974 movement, stands divided into four 
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sometimes feuding camps. Added to this is the parallel opposition force of 
the left-wing student organizations like the AISF, the SFI and the Bihar 
Students' Association. However, the left- and right-wing opposition is not 
uniform throughout the country, or even in one state. In the recent JNU 
Students' Union election, the SFI and the AISF joined hands and this 
alliance was opposed by the Yuva Janata, whereas in the Delhi University 
Students' Union election, the SFI joined hands with the Yuva Janata to fight 
the Vidyarthi Parishad. But invariably the Congress-controlled National 
Students Union of India and the Youth Congress are the weak enemies of 
both the left- and the other right-wing student organizations. 
As it stands today, student unrest has the necessary infrastructure for its 
transformation into a movement, and the potentiality of students in this 
regard has been indubitably proved. Whether such a transformation takes 
place in the near future depends much on the role of instrumental conditions, 
which at the moment seem to be unfavourable. 
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